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fully-fledged participation in the Euro summits. But Nečas is not totally clear about what he meant by 
fully-fledged participation, as he admitted that he doesn’t expect the Czech Republic to have full 
voting rights until it joins the euro. At the same time, even Nečas admits that the shape of the eurozone 
is of utmost importance for the Czech economy, as it is highly interconnected with that of the 
eurozone, especially Germany’s economy. Logically, therefore, it would be in the interests of the 
premier to have a seat at the table when crucial economic issues are being discussed.  
The third argument was that the Czech government does not need the fiscal treaty as it is planning to 
implement most of the envisaged fiscal consolidation measures domestically anyway. In fact, most of 
the measures in the new treaty are perfectly in line with the current economic policy of Prague. But the 
tricky thing for Nečas is that he does not have enough power to enshrine such a rule constitutionally, 
as he would need at least some votes from the opposition Social Democrats. But the latter are unlikely 
to support the government unless it signs up to the fiscal compact (which might also be a condition 
brought forward by his coalition partner, TOP09).
1 It is possible that fiscal discipline would be 
imposed in the form of a simple act of parliament, which on the one hand requires only a simple 
majority, but is also more likely to be overturned by future governments, especially if they are left-
wing. Thus, being a signatory to the treaty might actually be advantageous if Nečas is serious about 
fiscal discipline, as it would not be possible for future governments to withdraw from such obligations, 
since international treaties ratified by parliament (or a referendum) take precedence over regular acts 
of parliament.  
The question remains: what were the real motives of the Czech premier in refusing to join the pact? 
The reasons are difficult to discern, as probably only a few insiders know how Nečas arrived at this 
decision. The TOP09 leader Karel Schwarzenberg, who was on a tour of the Middle East at the time of 
the summit, described the premier’s stance as damaging for the country. The Chairman of the 
European Committee in the Lower Chamber, Jan Bauer, representing Nečas’ party, for his part found 
the outcome to be unexpected.  
One set of possible explanations is to be found mainly in Czech domestic politics. The Prime Minister 
finds himself on shaky ground within his own conservative party (the Civic Democratic Party, or 
ODS), where the eurosceptic wing, backed strongly by President Klaus (the party’s founder), is 
gaining ground as the debt crisis worsens. Given that Klaus is about to step down from the presidential 
post, but intends to stay active in politics, the question is whether he could make a comeback as the 
ODS party leader, possibly about to oust Nečas, or form an alternative eurosceptic party around him. 
The other likely explanation is simply a lack of strategic thinking on the part of the Czech Prime 
Minister as to what the implications of the Czech abstention from the treaty could be for his country’s 
position in the EU. He has consistently shown scepticism about the capacity of EU summits to 
produce a lasting solution to the debt crisis, clearly missing the point that current developments are 
largely about the future direction of European integration, and that a two-speed Europe is more likely 
to emerge than ever before, in which the Czech Republic might find itself in the outer circle. 
Another explanation is also plausible: Nečas might be convinced that this treaty does indeed pave the 
way to some kind of political union. As a politician who believes the EU to be solely a single market 
project, he naturally has a problem in signing up to a pact that might eventually lead to some kind of 
European federation. 
Finally, the fact that Nečas has not presented any arguments against the treaty suggests that his stance 
has to be considered as primarily an ideological one. It could be explained by an irrational and 
sentimental attachment to the UK Conservative Party, again dating back to early 1990s, which viewed 
the EU as a socialist, overregulated, French-dominated project, and the current premier’s position is a 
symbolic re-affirmation of this strange alliance.  
                                                      
1 TOP 09 (unofficial abbreviation of Tradice Odpovědnost Prosperita 09, meaning "Tradition Responsibility 
Prosperity 09") is a fiscally conservative political party, led by Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg, and noted 
for its support of the free market and the European Union.  WHY THE CZECHS DID NOT SIGN UP TO THE FISCAL TREATY | 3 
In any case, Nečas’s decision will have consequences both domestically and at the EU level. As stated 
above, the premier has already found himself in dispute with one coalition partner (TOP09), the 
opposition Social Democrats, but is also under the attack from much of the mainstream media and 
businesses. Apart from the fact that he has not presented any real arguments against the treaty, Nečas’ 
critics claim that he is succumbing too much to the threat of a presidential veto before trying to 
negotiate a consensus in the governing coalition and discussing the issue in the Parliament (which was 
exactly what Nečas argued back in December 2011). Given that on most of the policy issues the ODS 
and TOP09 are barely distinguishable, their attitude towards Europe might be the point on which the 
voters will decide. And this might have negative consequences for the ODS, as – paradoxical as it may 
seem – its highly educated and well-off electorate is largely pro-European.  
As for wider EU implications, the move is likely to reinforce the image of the Czechs as unpredictable 
troublemakers. Many European politicians, including Nicolas Sarkozy, are already asking why 
something that was acceptable in December is suddenly no longer possible. This follows on from 
earlier Czech moves in the EU, such as the fall of the government in the middle of the EU presidency 
with no convincing explanation, or the protractions over the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.  
Regardless of what the Czech abstention from the fiscal compact means in practical terms, the 
reputation of the country is likely to suffer further, as it is going to be perceived as a member that does 
not really know what it wants. The most unfortunate development, however, would be if the ‘we’ (the 
financially prudent, hard-working Czechs) and the ‘they’ (the undisciplined eurozone) scenario is 
exploited further by certain political forces internally, and translates into increasingly fervent 
euroscepticism among the population. At this point, the country could risk not only imaginary but real 
marginalisation within the Union.   